The High Crime of “LMAO”: How Cops Are Treating Mass Surveillance As a Joke

Police departments are exploiting automated license‑plate‑reader (ALPR) systems to harvest location data without legitimate justification, turning a public‑safety tool into a de‑facto surveillance net that erodes constitutional protections.

Misuse of ALPR Search Logs

On May 7 2025 a Goshen Police Department officer entered “idk” in the search field of a system that spans 6,474 ALPR networks and aggregates data from 82,413 cameras. The officer’s cryptic entry was logged as the reason for accessing the database, a pattern echoed nationwide where searches are tagged with frivolous terms like “LOL,” “LMAO,” and “sexy.” The Electronic Frontier Foundation’s analysis of Flock Safety logs shows that these nonsensical justifications are not isolated anomalies but a systemic practice across multiple jurisdictions.

Each entry creates a permanent record of a driver’s movements, yet the reasons recorded often bear no relation to any investigatory need. Because the logs are stored alongside the raw location data, the misuse compounds over time, creating a historical trail that can be mined for patterns unrelated to crime solving. The sheer volume of cameras and searches means that even a small percentage of frivolous queries translates into millions of unauthorized location points.

System Design Flaws that Enable Abuse

Flock Safety recently introduced a dropdown menu that forces officers to select a crime category before a search can be executed, ostensibly to add accountability. In practice, the dropdown merely provides a veneer of legitimacy; the system does not cross‑check the selected category against any evidentiary standard or require corroborating documentation. This design choice lowers the friction for a search while preserving the ability to log a bogus reason.

The underlying software lacks any warrant‑trigger or real‑time audit mechanism, allowing any officer with login credentials to retrieve the full historical record at will. Because the platform is supplied by private vendors such as Motorola Solutions and Axon, the public sector often outsources oversight to contracts that prioritize functionality over privacy safeguards. The result is a feedback loop where technical convenience outweighs constitutional scrutiny.

Legal and Civil‑Liberty Implications

The unchecked access described in the EFF analysis runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches, a right traditionally enforced through warrant requirements. By allowing “no warrant requirements” and offering only minimal post‑hoc audit trails, ALPR databases create a legal gray zone where mass location tracking can proceed without judicial oversight. Courts have begun to recognize that prolonged, indiscriminate surveillance constitutes a search, yet many municipalities have yet to adapt policies accordingly.

Beyond constitutional concerns, the practice threatens state data‑protection statutes that mandate purpose limitation and data minimization. When officers log reasons like “LOL,” they effectively falsify the purpose clause required by many privacy frameworks, exposing cities to liability for statutory violations. The cultural normalization of such behavior also undermines public trust, making future collaborations between law enforcement and technology firms increasingly fraught.

What This Actually Means For You

1. Every drive through a camera‑covered intersection is being recorded and stored, even if no crime is suspected.
2. Law‑enforcement officers can retrieve your travel history without a warrant, often citing meaningless reasons.
3. Municipal contracts with vendors like Flock Safety may lack robust privacy clauses, leaving citizens with limited recourse.
4. Judicial precedent is evolving, but until courts issue clear mandates, the default is continued unchecked surveillance.
5. Community advocacy and legislative pressure are the primary levers to demand stricter audit and warrant protocols.

Immediate Action Steps

Contact your city council or mayor’s office to request a copy of the ALPR policy and any recent audit reports; transparency is the first defense against abuse. Support or join local civil‑rights groups that are lobbying for statutory reforms requiring warrants or independent oversight before any mass‑location query can be executed.

Monitor upcoming council meetings where police technology contracts are discussed, and submit public comments that reference the EFF findings and the specific frivolous search reasons documented in the logs. Persistent civic pressure can compel municipalities to renegotiate contracts with stronger privacy safeguards.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why are police officers using “LMAO” as a reason to search ALPR data?

The EFF analysis shows that officers often enter placeholder text like “LMAO” when they have no legitimate investigative purpose, exploiting a system that does not verify the authenticity of the reason.

Do ALPR systems require a warrant before a search?

Current configurations, as highlighted by the Goshen incident, allow searches without any warrant requirement, relying only on internal logging that can be easily falsified.

What legal protections exist against this type of surveillance?

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and emerging state data‑protection statutes provide a basis to challenge warrant‑less searches, but enforcement depends on judicial interpretation and municipal policy reforms.

What Do You Think?

Should municipalities sacrifice the convenience of vendor‑provided ALPR tools for the certainty of constitutional safeguards, even if it means higher costs and slower deployment?